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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Wally Kay Schultz attempts to appeal from' the judgment and sentence
entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic battery.
Because Schultz failed to file his notice of appeal within 42 days of from the
judgment of conviction as required by I.A.R. 14, his appeal is untimely and
should be dismissed.

Alternatively, his conviction and sentence should be

affirmed
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas
On May 2, 2005, Lieutenant Kindig and Deputy Moore of the Minidoka
County Sheriff's Office responded to Schultz's residence to investigate a report of
domestic violence. (#33256' Trial Tr., p.7, Ls.13-17; p.12, Ls.2-20; p.34, Ls.322; p.39, L.15

- p.41,

L.1; p.56, Ls.16-17.) Schultz's live-in girlfriend, Laurie

Morrill, called 9-1-1 and reported being beaten at Schultz's residence. (#33256
Trial Tr., p.7, Ls.13-17; p.11, Ls.16-18; p.12, Ls.2-20; p.34, Ls.3-22; p.82, L.7 p.83, L.6; p.85, Ls.14-16; p.87, Ls.9-11; p.95, L.22; p.100, Ls.5-14; p.120, Ls.617.)
The officers arrived at Schultz's residence within minutes of receiving the
9-1-1 call and Lieutenant Kindig went to talk to Schultz who was standing outside

'

Supreme Court Docket No. 33255 is a consolidated appeal of two unrelated
Minidoka County cases involving Schultz: Case No. CR-2005-884 ("Drug case")
and CR-2005-01139 ("Battery case"). (Supreme Court Docket No. 33255, Order
Granting Motion To Consolidate Appeals dated September 27, 2006.) Because
Schultz does not appeal any issues related to the Drug case (Appellant's brief,
p.l), the state has cited solely to the record of the Battery case which, prior to
consolidation, was marked and identified as Supreme Court Docket No. 33256.

about "50 yards into the wrecking yard from the front of the house." (#33256
Trial Tr., p.8, L.17 - p.9, L.3.) Deputy Moore went into the house where he found
Laurie sobbing. (#33256 Trial Tr., p.8, L.25 - p.9, L.lO; p.1 I , Ls.16-18; p.12,
L.7.) He noticed her clothes "were in disarray, she was bleeding from her nose"
and trying to wipe the blood off of her face. (#33256 Trial Tr., p.12, Ls.5-10.)
Laurie told the officer that Schultz kicked and hit her. (#33256 Trial Tr., p.12,
L.25-p.13, L.1; p.22, Ls.21-22; p.94, Ls.1-13.)
Observing injuries to Laurie's face and her arm, Deputy Moore called for
emergency medical assistance. (#33256 Trial Tr., p.22., Ls.12-16.) After the
EMT examined Laurie's injuries, which included a bloody nose, scratches and
bruising on her left arm and swelling in her right knee and shin area, the officer
took some photographs. (#33256 Trial Tr., p.13, L.8

- p.14,

L.8, p.14, L.25 -

p.15, L.14; p.59, Ls.7-19; p.61, Ls.4-6; p.62, Ls.11-13; p.63, L.15 - p.64, L.5;
p.65, Ls.4-7; p.102, Ls.3-19; p.104, Ls.4-9; Trial Exhibits 1 -2, 8-10,)
Schultz was arrested and charged with felony domestic violence. (#33256

R., pp.47-48.) At trial, a jury found Schultz guilty. (#33256 R., p.lOO.) On
December 15, 2005, the district court entered judgment and imposed a unified
sentence of ten years with five years fixed, but suspended the sentence and
retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (#33256 R., pp.151-55; #33256 Augmented
Tr., p.105, Ls.21-24.) After a jurisdictional review hearing, the district court
entered an order on May 22, 2006, suspending the previously pronounced
sentence and placing Schultz on probation for five years. (#33256 R., p.162;
#33256 Augmented Tr., p.Tl1, Ls.21-24.) Three days later the court entered an

"Order Upon 180-Day Review Hearing, I.C. § 19-2601(4)" detailing the conditions
of Schultz's previously imposed five-year probation. (#33256 R., pp.162-68.)
Schultz filed a notice of appeal on July 6, 2006 (#33256 R., pp.171-73), timely
only from the "Order Upon 180-Day Review Hearing" entered May 25, 2006.

ISSUES
Schultz states the issue on appeal as:
Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct necessitating a new trial?
(Appellant's brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal and adds the following issue:
1. Is this Court without jurisdiction to consider Schultz's appellate claims
because Schultz failed to timely file his notice of appeal from the judgment of
conviction?
2. If this Court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of Schultz's appeal,
has Schultz failed to show he is entitled to relief with respect to any of his claims
of prosecutorial misconduct?

ARGUMENT
1.
This Court Is Without Jurisdiction To Consider Schultz's A ~ p e a l
Because Schultz Failed To Timely File His Notice Of A ~ p e aFrom
l
The Oriqinal Judqment Of Conviction
A.

Introduction
Schultz asks this Court to vacate his conviction for felony domestic

battery, alleging violations of his right to a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.6,18.)
This Court is without jurisdiction to entertain Schultz's appellate claim, however,
because Schultz failed to file his notice of appeal either within 42 days of the
entry of judgment or within 42 days of the district court's order placing him on
probation following the period of retained jurisdiction.

Schultz's appeal is

untimely and must be dismissed.
B.

Standard Of Review
"'A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when

brought to [the appellate courts'] attention and should be addressed prior to
considering the merits of an appeal."' State v. Kavaiecz, 139 ldaho 482, 483, 80
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Enqineerinq. Inc. v. ldaho State Bd. of
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 ldaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55,
57 (1987)). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free

review. Kavaiecz, 139 ldaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084.

C.

Schultz's Appeal Is Untimelv And Must Be Dismissed
The ldaho Appellate Rules govern the time and manner in which appeals

to the ldaho Supreme Court must be filed. With respect to appeals from the
district court, I.A.R. 14(a) provides:
(a) Appeals From the District Court. Any appeal as a matter of
right from the district court may be made only by physically filing a
notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within 42 days
from the date evidenced by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court
on any judgment, order or decree of the district court appealable as
a matter of right in any civil or criminal action. ... In a criminal case,
the time to file an appeal is enlarged by the length of time the
district court actually retains jurisdiction pursuant to ldaho Code.
When the court releases its retained jurisdiction or places the
defendant on probation, the time within which to appeal shall
commence to run.
I.A.R. 14(a) (emphasis added). A timely filed notice of appeal is a prerequisite to
appellate jurisdiction. I.A.R. 21; State v. Pavan, 128 ldaho 866, 920 P.2d 82 (Ct.
App. 1996); State v. Fuller, 104 ldaho 891, 665 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1983). The
failure to file a notice of appeal within the time limits prescribed by the appellate
rules requires "automatic dismissal" of the appeal. I.A.R. 21.
The district court entered judgment against Schultz on December 15,
2005, imposed a unified sentence of ten years with five years fixed, suspended
the sentence and retained jurisdiction for 180 days. (#33256 R., pp.151-55;
#33256 Augmented Tr., p.105, Ls.21-24.) On May 22, 2006, the district court
entered an order suspending Schultz's sentence and placing him on probation for
a period of five years. (#33256 R., p.162; #33256 Augmented Tr., p.111, Ls.2124.) Three days later, on May 25, 2006, the court entered a more detailed "Order
Upon 180-Day Review Hearing" memorializing the conditions of Schultz's five-

year period of probation. (#33256 R., pp.162-68.) Schultz did not file his notice
of appeal until July 6, 2006 (#33256 R., pp.171-73)

- 45

days after the court

entered its order placing Schultz on probation following the period of retained
jurisdiction. When the time for appeal is calculated from the date the district
court actually placed Schultz on probation, Schultz's appeal from the judgment is
not timely. See e.q., State v. Justice, 122 ldaho 407, 834 P.2d 1323 (Ct. App.
1992).
Schultz did timely file his notice of appeal from the district court's "Order
Upon 180-Day Review Hearing" entered on May 25, 2006. (#33256 R., pp.17173.) The timeliness of Schultz's appeal from this Order, however, does not
confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain the issues Schultz raises on appeal.
For that, Schultz would have had to raise these issues in a timely appeal from
May 22, 2006, the date the court placed Schultz on probation. See I.A.R. 14(a)
(The time to file an appeal from the judgment of conviction is enlarged only by
the length of time the court actually retains jurisdiction). The court's subsequent
order entered on May 25, 2006, simply sets forth the specific conditions of
Schultz's probation, it does not "extend the period for filing an appeal [from the
judgment of conviction] or begin that period anew." See Payan, 128 ldaho at
867, 920 P.2d at 83 (entry of an amended judgment does not necessarily "extend
the period for filing an appeal or begin that period anew.") Schultz's appeal
would only be considered timely if he challenged matters actually altered by the
"Order Upon 180-Day Review Hearing;" he has not raised any such issue on
appeal.

The appellate court does not have jurisdiction to address matters

unaffected by that subsequent order. See e.q. Walton, Inc, v. Jensen, 132 ldaho
716, 720, 979 P.2d 118, 122 (Ct. App. 1999);

m,128 ldaho at 867,920 P.2d

at 83.
Because Schultz now raises claims pertaining only to his right to a fair trial
his notice of appeal, filed more than 42 days after the jurisdictional period to file
his appeal was enlarged pursuant to I.A.R. 14, is untimely. Appellate review of
Schultz's conviction and sentence is therefore precluded. See e.a. Pavan, 128
ldaho at 867, 920 at 83 (citing State v. W a r ~ i 119
,
ldaho 292, 805 P.2d 498 (Ct.
App. 1991)) (direct review of judgment and sentence precluded where original
judgment contained all the terms defendant challenged, but where appeal was
timely only from amended judgment that did not alter any of those terms).
The ldaho Court of Appeals recognized in

m that "[tlhe period of

appeals for all criminal defendants in this state must be enforced uniformly." j&
at 867, 920 P.2d at 83. Like Payan, Schultz failed to file his notice of appeal
within the jurisdictional period set forth in I.A.R. 14(a), and the issuance of the
"Order Upon 180-day Review Hearing," which did not alter any of the terms of the
original judgment, did not extend the time for appeal. Because Schultz's appeal
is not timely, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it and it must be dismissed.
I.A.R. 21;

m,128 ldaho at 867, 920 P.2d at 83.

II.
Schultz Is Not Entitled To Relief On Any Of His Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims
A.

Introduction
Schultz argues that the prosecutor made two comments during closing

argument that prejudiced his right to a fair trial.

(Appellant's brief, pp.8-18.)

Schultz has failed to establish any basis for reversal, however, because he has
failed to establish that his due process rights were violated as a result of any
alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
B.

Standard Of Review And General Legal Standards Governina Claims Of
Prosecutorial Misconduct
A defendant is not entitled to relief based upon a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct unless he can establish two things: (1) the complained of conduct
was improper; and (2) the improper conduct prejudiced him. State v. RomeroGarcia, 139 Idaho 199, 202, 75 P.3d 1209, 1212 (Ct. App. 2003). Thus, a mere
assertion or finding that a particular question or statement was objectionable or
improper is insufficient to establish prosecutorial misconduct. As explained by
the United States Supreme Court:

"[lit is not enough that the prosecutors'

remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.

The relevant

question is whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden
v. Wainwriaht, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 ($982) ("[Tjhe touchstone
of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the

fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor."). In that regard, the
Supreme Court has indicated prosecutorial misconduct may occur where the
prosecutor "manipulate[s] or misstate[s] the evidence" or "implicate[s] other
specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain
silent."

at 181-82.

However, "a criminal conviction is not to be lightly

overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the
statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be
determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial."
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, the Court must consider
the probable effect that the prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's
ability to judge the evidence fairly."

Id. at

11-12. Consistent with Darden and

m,the ldaho Supreme Court has held that a conviction will be set aside for
prosecutorial misconduct only when the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to
result in fundamental error. State v. Hairston, 133 ldaho 496, 507, 988 P.2d

With respect to prosecutorial misconduct in the context of closing
argument the Supreme Court has stated:
Isolated passages of a prosecutor's argument, billed in advance to
the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the
same proportions. Such arguments, like all closing arguments of
counsel, are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event;
improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect and
meaning less than crystal clear. While these general observations
in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a
court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an
ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a
jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from
the plethora of less damaging interpretations.

Donnellv v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974).
The ldaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of
reviewing closing arguments in light of their improvisational nature, noting that "in
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court] must keep
in mind the realities of trial." State v. Field, 144 ldaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273,
285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, II 1 ldaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-33
(1986)). The ldaho Supreme Court has further recognized "[tlhe right to due
process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but a fair one," and
the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for
misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Revnolds, 120 ldaho 445, 451, 816 P.2d
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991).
Application of the foregoing standards to Schultz's claims of prosecutorial
misconduct reveals he was not deprived of a fair trial,
C.

Schultz Is Not Entitled To Relief On His Allesation That The Prosecutor
Ensased In Misconduct Bv comment in^ On His Silence
At trial, Schultz's counsel contended Schultz acted out of self-defense

(#33256 Augmented Tr., p.69, L.24

- p.,70, L.2); Schultz did not testify.

closing, the prosecutor argued:
There are five things that have to be present in order for there to be
self-defense, and I want you to think about the evidence in this
case, and particularly the only testimony that touched on this, and
that would be the testimony of Laurie Morrill. Nobody else testified
about it. There wasn't any other testimony about it because there
were only two people present: Laurie Morrill and the defendant.

During

(#33256 Augmented Tr., p.52, Ls.7-14.)

Schultz's counsel did not object.

(Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Nevertheless, Schultz now contends this statement by
the prosecutor abridged "his right to silence, his right to a fair trial, and his right to
due process of law" (Appellant's brief, p.8 (footnotes omitted)), because, Schultz
claims, it suggests he "should be found guilty because he did not take the
witness stand to refute Ms. Morrill's testimony" (Appellant's brief, p.10). Schultz's
argument fails because this comment by the prosecutor can be viewed equally
as a comment not on Schultz's silence or his failure to testify, but as a comment
on the state of the evidence.
Prosecutors have considerable latitude in closing argument and have the
right to discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising
therefrom. State v. Pavne, --- P.3d ---, 2008 WL 2447447 *12 (Idaho 2008);
State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003); State v. Phillips,
144 ldaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). The purpose of the
prosecutor's closing argument is to enlighten the jury and help the jurors
remember and interpret the evidence. State v. Revnolds, 120 ldaho 445, 450,
816 P.2d 1002,1007 (Ct. App. 1991).
While it is undoubtedly true that a prosecutor may not comment on a
defendant's silence or his failure to testify to infer guilt, State v. Strouse, 133
ldaho 709, 992 P.2d 158 (1999), when rebutting a defendant's claim of selfdefense, a prosecutor's argument that the state's evidence is uncontradicted
does not constitute such an impermissible reference where "witnesses other than
the defendant could have contradicted the evidence." State v. McMurry, 143

ldaho 312, 314-15, 143 P.3d 400, 402-03 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting State v.
Hod~es,105 Idaho 588, 592, 671 P.2d 1054, 1055 (1983)). The prosecutor's
comments must be viewed in light of the evidence presented to the jury, and the
Court should not "lightly infer . . . the most damaging meaning" or assume the
jury "dr[e]w that meaning from ... less damaging interpretations." DeChristoforo,
416 U.S. at 647. Rather, as explained in State v. Revnolds, 120 ldaho 445, 44950, 816 P.2d 1002, 1006-07 (Ct. App. 1991), "the propriety of a given argument
will depend largely upon the facts of each case" and the prosecutor may properly
present argument based on the evidence in the record.
Schultz asserts the prosecutor's comment was an impermissible comment
on his decision not to testify. Despite not objecting to this comment at trial or
requesting the court admonish the jury to disregard it, Schultz now claims the
comment was "so egregious andlor inflammatory that any consequent prejudice
could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury
that the comments should be disregarded." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) Contrary to
Schulz's contention, a fair reading of the prosecutor's statement in this case is
not that it was made to ask the jury to infer Schultz's guilt from his failure to
testify. Rather, the prosecutor's statement expressly called attention to the "five
things that have to be present in order for there to be self-defense" and the
absence of any evidence indicating Schultz hit and kicked Ms. Morrill out of selfdefense.
While Schultz's reasonable belief in the need to act in self-defense could
have been shown through his testimony at trial, evidence of his alleged self-

defense could also have been shown by circumstantial evidence through the
testimony of other witnesses. For example, the officer who observed Schultz in
response to the 9-1-1 call could have testified as to whether he observed any
scratches or injuries to Schultz or whether Schultz's clothing appeared ripped or
torn. The prosecutor's comment was a fair comment on the state of the evidence
and the insufficiency of the evidence, in general, to demonstrate Schultz's
reasonable belief in the necessity to defend himself. As the context of the
prosecutor's closing argument reflects, this statement simply encouraged the jury
to weigh the evidence of self-defense and reject it. (#33256 Augmented Tr.,
p.52, Ls.7-22.) Given the two possible interpretations of the prosecutor's
argument regarding the lack of evidence contradicting Laurie's testimony, the
Court cannot conclude that the prosecutor's comment was "manifestly intended
or ... of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be
a comment on the failure of the accused to testify." McMurry, 143 Idaho at 315,
143 P.3d 402 (emphasis omitted). Thus, the prosecutor's argument that no
evidence existed as to Schultz's claim of self-defense was not an improper
comment on Schultz's failure to testify. Because the prosecutor's argument was
proper, Schultz has failed to show error, fundamental error, or a violation of due
process.

D.

The Prosecutor's Request For Justice Did Not Constitute Misconduct
In his closing argument the prosecutor also commented, in relevant part:
A wise judge once told me that we're in the business of
giving out hope. Laurie Morrill needs some hope. She needs to
know that the system works. Show her the system works. You can

protect Laurie Morrill and other Laurie Morrill's [sic] by weighing the
evidence and returning a just and correct verdict. You can hold the
defendant accountable. I ask you to do that.
(Augmented Trial Tr., p.63, L.25

-

p.64, 1.6.)

Despite not objecting to this

statement at trial, Schultz argues on appeal it was improper because, he claims,
it appeals to the jurors' passions and emotions. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-14.)
Specifically, Schultz contends this statement "encouraged the jury to reach a
guilty verdict based on sympathy for Ms. Morrill, a desire to protect her from
further abuse, and a desire to cure society's domestic violence problems."
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Although he is correct that prosecutors are prohibited
from using inflammatory tactics to appeal to the emotions of the jury, State v.
Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007). Schultz has nevertheless
failed to establish that the prosecutor's statement of which he complains in this
case was "calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or
prejudice against the defendant," such that the statement rises to the level of
fundamental error.

State v. Babb, 125 ldaho 934, 942, 877 P.2d 905, 913

(1994), auoted in State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969
(2003). In support of his argument, Schultz seems to rely upon United States v.

. 2005)' State v. Phillips, 144 ldaho 82, 156
Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142 (9th Clr.
P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 2007), State v. Beebe, 145 ldaho 570, 181 P.3d 496 (Ct. App.
2007), State v. Pecor, 132 ldaho 359, 972 P.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1998), State v.

m,122 ldaho 809, 839 P.2d 1223 (Ct. App. 1992), and State v. Baruth, 107
ldaho 651, 691 P.2d 1266 (Ct. App. 1984). These cases either do not stand for
the proposition Schultz claims or are easily distinguishable.

In Weatherspoon, on several occasions throughout closing argument the
prosecutor improperly asked the jurors to alleviate the social problem of felons
possessing semiautomatic handguns by convicting the defendant, even though
the court had admonished the prosecutor on several occasions to confine his
comments to whether the defendant was guilty. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at
1149.

On appeal the Ninth Circuit concluded that because there was no

evidence admitted regarding the number of felons who own firearms, the trial
court failed to give proper curative instructions, and the repeated appeals urged
conviction solely on the basis of fear and emotion, the comments were improper
and prejudiced Weatherspoon.

Id.

The statements in this case are different than those in Weatherspoon.
Here, the prosecutor did not make repeated statements about protecting society
throughout closing argument in violation of court admonishments. Also, the
comment in Schultz's case did not appeal to the emotions of the jurors, but
instead merely requested the jury to fulfill its duty and "show ... the system works

... by weighing the evidence and returning a just and correct verdict."
Finally, in Weatherspoon, the court failed to give proper curative instructions
upon request of the defendant. Here, the defendant did not object or request any
curative instruction; also, prior to deliberations, the district court instructed the
jury to apply the law to the facts, based upon the evidence presented, and that
counsels' arguments were not evidence. (#33256 Augmented Trial Tr., p.37,
L.17 - p.38, L.23; Jury Instruction Nos., 10 and 11.)

Also, in Phillips, over defense counsel's objections, the prosecutor
repeatedly suggested to the jury during closing argument that they "might feel
irritated and upset" by the testimony of a witness in the case.

Id.at 89, 156 P.3d

at 588. The Court of Appeals agreed with Phillips that the prosecutor's argument
was inflammatory and "seemingly calculated to arouse negative emotions"
against a particular witness.

Id.

In contrast to the inflammatory statements made by the prosecutor in
Phillips, the prosecutor's isolated remark in this case was neither inflammatory
nor obviously calculated to appeal to the jury's passion or emotion. In fact, there
was nothing about the statement that would have influenced the jury, either
subtly or overtly, to determine Schultz's guilt based on anything other than the
evidence presented at trial.

See Sheahan, 139 ldaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969.

Nor was the comment "so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent
prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing
the jury that the comments should be disregarded." State v. Cortez, 135 ldaho
561, 565, 21 P.3d 498, 502 (Ct. App. 2001), ~ u o t e din Sheahan, 139 ldaho at
280, 77 P.3d at 969.
Schultz's reliance on Beebe, Pecor, Piete and

is also misplaced.

Contrary to Schultz's assertions, this is not a case where the prosecutor
mischaracterized Schultz's defense to appeal to concerns about protecting the
public. Compare State v. Beebe, 145 ldaho 570, 181 P.3d 496 (Ct. App. 2007)
(prosecutor's comment suggesting that the defendant claimed he should be
"allowed to commit crimes" because he was mentally ill was fundamental,

reversible error).

This is also not a case where the prosecutor made "reference

to the jurors' families and hypothesized the commission of a crime against them."
Compare State v. Pecor, 132 ldaho 359, 972 P.2d 737 (Ct. App. 1998)
(prosecutor's comment to the jury that defendant "is the dealer to your sons and
your daughters" was fundamental, but harmless, error). Neither is this a case
involving the prosecutor's questioning of a victim for the purpose of evoking
sympathy. Compare State v. Peite, 122 ldaho 809, 839 P.2d 1223 (Ct. App.
1992) (prosecutor's question of the victim asking her to explain how hard the
rape has been on her improperly evoked juror sympathy, but was not prejudicial
to the defendant). Nor is this a case where the prosecutor told the jury it was
responsible for protecting the community. Compare State v. Baruth, 107 ldaho
651, 691 P.2d 1266 (Ct. App. 1984) (prosecutor's comments that "the entire
criminal justice system" as well as the defendant was on trial and that "you [the
jury] are the only thing standing between the people of the community and Mr.
Baruth robbing or doing anything else he chooses to anyone else" constituted
prosecutorial misconduct, but was harmless error).
The prosecutor's request of the jury in this case to "show ... the system
works ... by weighing the evidence and returning a just and correct verdict" did
not "encourage the jury to reach a guilty verdict based upon sympathy" for the
victim. That the prosecutor asked the jury to fulfill its responsibility to reach a
verdict based upon the evidence presented did not render the comment
misconduct, nor was his request of the jury improper. See State v. Larsen, 81
ldaho 90, 98, 337 P.2d 1, 6 (1959) ("The general rule is that argument by the

prosecuting attorney merely urging the jurors in a criminal prosecution to do their
duty, and to enforce the criminal law generally or the particular law under which
the prosecution was instituted, does not constitute a ground for a new trial or a
reversal but is within the range of proper argument.") (citation omitted). Rather,
the prosecutor's argument in this case was a proper comment that, based on the
evidence, the jury should "hold the defendant accountable."
Even if this brief portion of the prosecutor's argument could be deemed
improper, it does not amount to fundamental error. Asking the jury to "[slhow her
[Laurie] the system works," did not so infect the trial with unfairness that it
violated due process because it could not have influenced the jury to convict
Schultz of felony domestic battery without sufficient evidence, particularly since
the jury could have believed conviction of a lesser offense would be adequate to
give Laurie "hope" and "[slhow her the system works."
Because Schultz's claims of prosecutorial misconduct raised for the first
time on appeal do not constitute error, much less fundamental error, he is not
entitled to relief.

E.

The Prosecutor's Comments, Even If Fundamental Error. Do Not Entitle
Schultz To A Reversal Of His Conviction
Even if the prosecutor's comment during closing argument rose to the

level of fundamental error, such error does not automatically require reversal of
Schultz's conviction. See State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 163 P.3d 1175
(2007) (prosecutorial misconduct, though fundamental error, was nevertheless

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

"An error is harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt if the Court can conclude, based upon the evidence and
argument presented during the trial, that the jury would have reached the same
result absent the error."

Id.(citing State v.

Sandoval-Tena, 138 ldaho 908, 71

P.3d 1055 (2003)); see also Phillips, 144 ldaho at 88, 156 P.3d at 589. Although
Schultz argues otherwise, a review of the record in this case shows that any error
committed by the prosecutor during closing argument was, at worst, harmless.
In light of the evidence presented during Schultz's two-day trial, there is no
reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument
contributed to Schultz's conviction. The jury was presented with overwhelming
evidence which supported, beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury's finding that
Schultz was guilty of committing felony domestic battery.

Laurie Morrill's

testimony was corroborated by the physical evidence of her injuries, as well as
other witnesses, including the testimony of Deputy Moore (#33256 Trial Tr.,
pp.5-26), Lieutenant Kindig (#33256 Trial Tr., pp.32-57) and the EMT who
examined her (#33256 Trial Tr., pp.59-66). The record provides no support for a
conclusion that the jury would have reached a different outcome, absent the
prosecutor's comments during closing argument.
Given the amount of evidence connecting Schultz to the injuries suffered
by Laurie Morrill, if there was any misconduct rising to the level of fundamental
error, the error was harmless. Schultz has failed to show any basis for reversal
of his conviction.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court dismiss Schultz's appeal as
untimely, or in the alternative, affirm Schultz's conviction and sentence for felony
domestic battery.
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